

EXHIBIT B

Analysis of Secretary Powell's February 5, 2003 Statements Before the United Nations

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Many of Secretary Powell's statements at his February 5, 2003 presentation before the United Nations Security Council appear to have been either (1) not supported by the available intelligence, or (2) at a minimum, backed by intelligence far less certain than Powell had claimed.

Alleged Iraqi Plans to Hide Forbidden Ammunition from U.N. Inspectors

During his presentation, Powell provided this translation of an intercepted conversation between Iraqi army officers:

“They're inspecting the ammunition you have, yes.

“Yes.

“For the possibility there are forbidden ammo.

“For the possibility there is by chance forbidden ammo?”

“Yes.

“And we sent you a message yesterday to clean out all of the areas, the scrap areas, the abandoned areas. Make sure there is nothing there.”¹

The incriminating phrases “clean all of the areas” and “Make sure there is nothing there” do not appear in the official State Department translation of the exchange:

“Lt. Col: They are inspecting the ammunition you have.

“Col: Yes.

“Lt. Col: For the possibility there are forbidden ammo.

“Col: Yes?”

“Lt. Col: For the possibility there is by chance, forbidden ammo.

¹ Secretary of State Colin Powell, Remarks to the U.N. Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html>.

“Col: Yes.

“Lt. Col: And we sent you a message to inspect the scrap areas and the abandoned areas.

“Col: Yes.”²

The following passage appears in *Plan of Attack* by Bob Woodward:

[Powell] had decided to add his personal interpretation of the intercepts to rehearsed script, taking them substantially further and casting them in the most negative light. Concerning the intercept about inspecting for the possibility of “forbidden ammo,” Powell took the interpretation further: “Clean out all of the areas. . . . Make sure there is nothing there.” None of this was in the intercept.³

Later in the presentation, Powell stated: “We know that Saddam’s son, Qusay, ordered the removal of all prohibited weapons from Saddam's numerous palace complexes.”⁴ The January 31, 2003 evaluation of Powell's draft remarks prepared for him by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (“INR”) flagged this claim as “WEAK”: “WEAK. Qusay order to remove prohibited items from palaces.”⁵

Alleged Iraqi Concealment of Vital Files

Regarding alleged Iraqi concealment of key files, Powell stated: “key files from military and scientific establishments have been placed in cars that are being driven around the countryside by Iraqi intelligence agents to avoid detection.”⁶ The January 31, 2003 INR evaluation flagged this claim as "WEAK": “WEAK. Sensitive files being driven around in cars,

² “Iraq: Failing to Disarm - Transcript of Iraqi Conversation - Ammunition,” (Feb. 5, 2003), *available at* <http://web.archive.org/web/20030621104748/www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/pix/events/secretary/2003/17399.htm>. No longer available on State Department website.

³ BOB WOODWARD, *PLAN OF ATTACK* 310 (2004).

⁴ Secretary of State Colin Powell, Remarks to the U.N. Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003), *available at* <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html>.

⁵ U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 108TH CONG., *REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ* 423 (2004).

⁶ Secretary of State Colin Powell, Remarks to the U.N. Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003), *available at* <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html>.

in apparent shell game. Plausibility open to question.”⁷ This claim was again flagged in the February 3, 2003 INR evaluation of a subsequent draft of Powell's presentation:

Page 4, last bullet, re key files being driven around in cars to avoid inspectors. This claim is highly questionable and promises to be targeted by critics and possibly UN inspection officials as well.⁸

Alleged Iraqi Possession of Biological Weapons and Dispersal Equipment

On the issue of biological weapons and dispersal equipment, Powell stated: “we know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was disbursing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agents to various locations, distributing them to various locations in western Iraq.”⁹ The January 31, 2003 INR evaluation flagged this claim as “WEAK”:

“WEAK. Missiles with biological warheads reportedly dispersed. This would be somewhat true in terms of short-range missiles with conventional warheads, but is questionable in terms of longer-range missiles or biological warheads.”¹⁰

This claim was again flagged in the February 3, 2003 evaluation of a subsequent draft of Powell's presentation: “Page 5. first para, claim re missile brigade dispersing rocket launchers and BW warheads. This claim too is highly questionable and might be subjected to criticism by UN inspection officials.”¹¹ Powell later showed a slide of a satellite photograph of an Iraqi munitions bunker, and stated:

The two arrows indicate the presence of sure signs that the bunkers are storing chemical munitions . . . [t]he truck you [...] see is a signature item. It's a decontamination vehicle in case something goes wrong.¹²

⁷ U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ 423 (2004).

⁸ *Id.* at 429.

⁹ Secretary of State Colin Powell, Remarks to the U.N. Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html>.

¹⁰ U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ 424 (2004).

¹¹ *Id.* at 429.

¹² Secretary of State Colin Powell, Remarks to the U.N. Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html>.

The January 31, 2003 INR evaluation flagged this claim as "WEAK": "10-11. ***/WEAK. We support much of this discussion, but we note that decontamination vehicles-cited several times in the text-are water trucks that can have legitimate uses...Iraq has given UNMOVIC what may be a plausible account for this activity-that this was an exercise involving the movement of conventional explosives; presence of a fire safety truck (water truck, which could also be used as a decontamination vehicle) is common in such an event."¹³

Powell further stated: "UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons."¹⁴ The January 31, 2003 INR evaluation flagged this statement as "WEAK": "the claim that experts agree UAVs fitted with spray tanks are 'an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons' is WEAK."¹⁵

Alleged Iraqi Concealment of Iraqi Weapons Experts and Deception of U.N. Inspectors

On this issue, Powell stated: "in mid-December weapons experts at one facility were replaced by Iraqi intelligence agents who were to deceive inspectors about the work that was being done there."¹⁶ The January 31, 2003 INR evaluation flagged this claim as "WEAK": "*/WEAK. Iraqi intelligence officials posing as WMD scientists. Such claims are not credible and are open to criticism, particularly by the UN inspectorates."¹⁷

Powell further stated: "On orders from Saddam Hussein, Iraqi officials issued a false death certificate for one scientist, and he was sent into hiding."¹⁸ The January 31, 2003 INR evaluation flagged this claim as "WEAK": "WEAK. Alleged false death certificate for scientist. Not implausible, but UN inspectors might question it. (Note: Draft states it as fact.)"¹⁹

¹³ U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ 424 (2004).

¹⁴ Secretary of State Colin Powell, Remarks to the U.N. Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003), *available at* <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html>.

¹⁵ U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ 426 (2004).

¹⁶ Secretary of State Colin Powell, Remarks to the U.N. Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003), *available at* <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html>.

¹⁷ U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ 424 (2004).

¹⁸ Secretary of State Colin Powell, Remarks to the U.N. Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003), *available at* <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html>.

¹⁹ U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ 425 (2004).

Powell further stated: “A dozen [WMD] experts have been placed under house arrest, not in their own houses, but as a group at one of Saddam Hussein's guest houses.”²⁰ The January 31, 2003 INR evaluation flagged this claim as “WEAK”: “WEAK. 12 experts reportedly under house arrest, 70 others in prison, to prevent contact with inspectors. Highly questionable.”²¹

Powell further stated: “In the middle of January, experts at one facility that was related to weapons of mass destruction, those experts had been ordered to stay home from work to avoid the inspectors. Workers from other Iraqi military facilities not engaged in illicit weapons projects were to replace the workers who’d been sent home.”²² The January 31, 2003 INR evaluation flagged this claim as “WEAK”: “WEAK. Experts at one facility being substituted by workers from other facilities. Plausibility open to question.”²³

²⁰ Secretary of State Colin Powell, Remarks to the U.N. Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003), *available at* <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html>.

²¹ U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ 425 (2004).

²² Secretary of State Colin Powell, Remarks to the U.N. Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003), *available at* <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html>.

²³ U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ 425 (2004).